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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          
No. 07-3956
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WAYNE CALABRETTA,
Appellant
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. No. 05-cr-00519)
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 13, 2010
Before:   BARRY, WEIS and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
Filed: June 29, 2010
__________
OPINION 
                     
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Defendant pleaded guilty to scheming to defraud a financial institution, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2.  The District Court sentenced him to, among other
2things, twelve months and one day in prison and ordered him to pay restitution.  Despite
waiving the right to appeal his sentence, defendant now challenges a portion of the
restitution order.  We hold that enforcement of the waiver would not result in a
miscarriage of justice and will affirm the sentence.
From 1995 to 2002, defendant opened a number of credit card accounts
using his relatives’ names and personal identifying information without their knowledge
or permission.  He then used these accounts to pay off his own personal debt.  In 2005, he
was charged with six counts of bank fraud, one count of credit card fraud, and one count
of fraudulent use of a social security number.  Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to a
one-count Superseding Information.  
According to the Plea Agreement, defendant consented to pay an
unspecified amount of restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663.  He also
“voluntarily waive[d] the right to file any appeal[ or] any collateral attack . . . which
challenge[d] the sentence imposed by the sentencing court[,]” provided that the sentence
was within an agreed-upon range under the Guidelines.  For purposes of calculating that
range, defendant stipulated that his crime “result[ed] in a loss of more than $70,000, but
less than $120,000.”  
The district judge opened the sentencing hearing by describing the
government’s two restitution proposals.  The first asked for repayment of $121,734.97. 
The second sought restitution in that amount to J.P. Morgan Chase, the defrauded bank. 
  We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo.  United States v.1
Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).  Defendant bears the burden of showing that
such waiver should not be enforced.  See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d
Cir. 2001).
3
In addition, $49,007.36 would be paid to one of the defendant’s victims for legal fees
incurred as a direct result of the defendant’s crime.  Specifically, the victim had retained
counsel to defend against claims by credit card companies and collection agencies taken
in by the scheme.  When asked about the two restitution proposals, defense counsel stated
that he “would leave restitution to the Court’s discretion.  We take no position.  Either
plan is fine with us.”  
Defendant now argues that restitution covering the victim’s legal fees is not
permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3663 or § 3663A.  Before addressing that question, we must
determine whether defendant has waived his right to raise this issue on appeal.  See
United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (court “will not exercise . . .
jurisdiction to review the merits of . . . appeal if” it finds that appellate waiver is valid).  1
“Waivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, are valid,
unless they work a miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563
(3d Cir. 2001).  Defendant does not dispute that the waiver in this case was knowing and
voluntary.  Rather, he contends that, because the restitution imposed is contrary to federal
statutes, enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
 Although we have declined to precisely define the phrase “miscarriage of
4justice,” we have observed that it “connotes something grave and out of the ordinary[,]”
suggesting more than “mere legal error.”  United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 239 (3d
Cir. 2008).  “A waiver of the right to appeal includes a waiver of the right to appeal
difficult or debatable legal issues - indeed, it includes a waiver of the right to appeal
blatant error.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (quoting United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166,
1169 (11th Cir. 1999)).  Knowing and voluntary waivers should be nullified “sparingly
and without undue generosity.”  United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir.
2005) (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)).
At no point during the sentencing hearing did defendant in this case object
to repaying the legal fees his victim incurred as a result of the fraudulent activities. 
Defense counsel repeatedly refused to take a position regarding the restitution proposals,
stating “Either plan is fine with us.”  Under these circumstances, we conclude that
enforcing the waiver would not constitute a “miscarriage of justice.”  See Khattak, 273
F.3d at 563 (listing factors to consider before invalidating appellate waiver).
In light of that holding, we will not exercise our authority to review the
merits of the defendant’s appeal.  See Gwinnett, 483 F.3d at 203.
Accordingly, the Judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.  
